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The thesis examines the economic of information service in the case of service 
quality downgrade as user number increases (congestion externality). It’s a 
notable phenomenon when the service demands system resources critically. We 
set up three usability models, and explore them in monopolist and duopolist 
market, respectively. The results were then compared and it suggests that in 
monopolist market, the quality downgrade will generate a fluctuation of user 
population, and ISP tend to set the price higher to minimize fluctuations and 
ensure profits. While in duopolist market, there is no market equilibrium and both 
firms will try to be the price leader. What’s more, given the opportunity to offer 
two products, the firm will opt for offering a single product.  
 
Implications for ISP’s strategy as well as government policies (social planner) are 
discussed. It’s recommended for ISPs to keep consumers informed of the real 
time user numbers to help them elude congestion and minimize the market 
demand fluctuation. For consumers, postponing the purchasing decision facing 
congestion will be a handy option. 
 
Keywords: ISP; congestion; network effect; Monopoly market; competition; 
Information goods; product differentiation 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction and Thesis Overview 
 
In Chapter 1, we provide the motivation for this research and define its scope. 
Specifically, it addresses the following questions: 
1. What is special about information service sharing? 
2. What is information service congestion? 
3. What are the defining characteristics of information services with congestion? 
4. What is the scope of this thesis? 
 
1.1 Information service sharing 
 
The rising of INTERNET age has brought about great changes in the concept of public 
service. We define Information services as those public services built on network servers 
and aimed to serve remote network users. Common information services such as IP 
phone, email service, file sharing service and online games demonstrated several special 
traits compared with traditional services. 
 
With building up of INTERNET across the planet, many information services are now 
located on Internet. A distinctive characteristic of Internet is that users are now remotely 
connected. They can access the service from a single service provider simultaneously, 
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while their physical distance may be thousands of miles away. The services a user take 
use of on the Internet would no longer be necessarily his own private possession, like a 
car or a meal. It could now be public goods that can be shared by many other Internet 
users. For example, when you are playing an online game, the only product—the game is 
not only played by you, but also by all the other players online. Consumers are paying the 
subscription fee of the game to enjoy it with other players, not to own it exclusively. On 
the other hand, since Internet users are remotely, rather than closely connected, it is free 
for them to decide whether or not, or when to consume, just to their interest. Other users’ 
consuming decision will not directly affect his options.  
 
1.2 Information Service Congestion 
 
Along with the sharing of the online product, here comes one question: will the service 
quality remain constant with different user numbers? Due to the exclusiveness of some 
parts of online products, e.g. bandwidth, server CPU loop, the service quality will 
degrade when user number increases. This is more notable when the service is highly 
resource demanding. IP telephony and online game belong to this type. They are very 
sensitive to the service quality, and demand very high on system resources. Therefore, we 
will pay most of our attention to this type of products. Furthermore, since online 
consumers are remotely distributed and their consuming activities are not directly 
connected, the impact they bring to the service quality received by other consumers will 
only be in the form of user number increase.  In another word, the service quality 
received by a consumer will be a function of the system capacity and the total user 
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number. Ceterisparibus, the higher the system capacity and the smaller the user number, 
the better service quality a consumer can enjoy. 
 
Before Information age, the phenomenon of quality degrading with consumer number 
increase could be observed in places like electric power supply industry and road traffic. 
Generally, the electricity output is constant in the short-run. In a time when most electric 
usages happen (peak hour), there could be a shortage of the electric power supply, 
causing power cut off to the users, or even blackout. On the other hand, great amount of 
electricity was wasted in non-peak hours, since redundant electricity can not be easily 
saved for later use. To solve the problem, dynamic pricing of electricity was widely used 
by setting different prices during different hours. Consumers will try to shift to non-peak 
hours to enjoy the lower price.  
 
Road congestion is also a problem to which transportation researchers have struggled for 
years to find the solvent. Since land is scarce and road capacity is expensive to construct, 
practically it is impossible to build a road free of congestion. Researchers studied 
congestion at microscopic and macroscopic levels. At macroscopic level vehicles are 
treated as a fluid-like continuum. It is not a popular idea nowadays since congestion, 
unlike fluid flow, is not a purely physical phenomenon but rather the result of people’s 
trip-making decisions and minute-by-minute driving behavior. (Lindsey and Verhoef, 
1999) However, fluid-like continuum has its merits when we consider the fact that 
vehicles in congestion are more or less combined to move together.  They can not simply 
get out of the congestion as users of information systems.  
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On a traditional service site, new users could be scared off if there were already too many 
users on site and the service quality could become intolerable. However, since potential 
users of information services are geographically dispersed, they may be unaware of the 
overcrowdiness and keep joining the user population, and that is the direct cause for 
network congestion and server breakdown. 
 
1.3 Features of information services 
 
After comparing with traditional services, we can make a definition of information 
services by naming its specific attributes (These attributes not necessarily hold for all 
information services, but they belong to the typical type of information services we are 
interested in this research): 
1. Information service are built in a central location but distributed to users remotely 
located 
2. Different users can enjoy the information service simultaneously, they don’t need 
to wait in a queue to be served in sequence 
3. Users of information services can make their consumption decision 
independently. They can choose when to join and when to quit the service, 
without being affected by other users 
4. Service quality for individual users of the information service will decline when 
total user number increases 
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5. If not informed by service provider, Information service users can not have the 
information of current or future user numbers. Consequently they can’t predict the 
congestion before they make the decision to join the service 
 
1.4 Scope of the thesis 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to explore the intrinsic nature of this new ground. We 
want to know what kind of situation an individual consumer of information service will 
experience when he is not realized of potential user number and congestion. We’d also 
like to know what can be done by users and information service providers to avoid or 
minimize congestion, hence protect their benefits. We set up three different models, one 
as a frame of reference with constant consumer usability; the other two represent the 
market with degrading consumer usability. Our model is novel in the way that it 
combined the user usability with user numbers, it will lead to a totally different market 
situation. By comparing different profit maximizing actions taken by monopolists in 
these three models, we can gain insight of the quality declining nature of information 
services. 
 
Another important issue that has been emphasized is competition. We set up a 
simultaneous duopoly environment and once again put the above three models into it. 




This research aims to make some contributions in the following aspects: 
• Providing an integrated review of the theory and practice in following streams of 
literature: 1) product differentiation and versioning, 2) price discrimination, 3) 
Information goods, 4) Congestion, 5) Network externality, 6) Market entry 7) Game 
theory 
• Developing analytical solutions that yield important managerial insights for 
information service provider’s strategies in product quality and pricing. Specifically, 
we find that facing declining service quality, ISPs tend to set the price higher 
• Investigating the impact of government policies (Social planner) on ISP’s profits and 
on social welfare. We also suggest the optimal strategy for social planner 
• The competition was studied. We find that equilibrium is hard to be established in a 
market with congestion externality. 
 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we made a literature 
review about the study has done in the areas we came across in the thesis, which includes 
product differentiation, price discrimination, network externality, and so on. In chapter 3, 
we set up three different consumer usability models, one as a frame of reference with 
constant consumer usability, the other two represent the market with degrading consumer 
usability. Chapter 4 explores the 3 models in a monopoly market. We find that with 
degrading quality, the price tends to be set higher, and the unit development cost should 
be lower to allow the firm gain positive profit. In chapter 5, our study extended to 
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duopoly market. We find that in a duopoly market, there is no equilibrium for competing 



















Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
In chapter 2, we first explore literature on economics of information services. We will put 
our emphasis on previous studies on pricing strategies, product differentiation, market 
entry and network externalities, both on offline and online services. Then we pay our 
attention on congestion. We will find out , as studied in previous researches, what’s the 
difference in online and offline congestion, how consumer and service providers behave 
in congestion and how congestion affects competition among them. 
 
2.1 Economics of Information services 
 
Unlike traditional services, information services were built at one site while the users of 
the service are remotely distributed. The economic of online service differs from that of 
traditional service in many aspects: the reproduction cost, diffusion rate, decision to 
differentiation and the market equilibrium. 
 
2.1.1 Reproduction cost and free trial 
 
A distinct feature of information services is that the costs of building the service are 
primarily fixed development and maintaining costs, while the reproduction and 
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distribution costs is almost negligible. Cost-based pricing makes little sense in this 
context; value based pricing is much more appropriate. (Varian, 1997) Because of this 
zero reproduction cost feature, some pricing approaches are becoming very common for 
information goods. Many information service providers would allow for free trial of their 
services, which can be totally free for all users or require user identities. Ackerlof (1970) 
demonstrated that quality uncertainty and asymmetric information between sellers and 
buyers can lead to severe adverse selection problems. This could make a relatively better 
product forced out of the market. Free trial can effectively minimize this problem. With 
further thoughts, the effects for the free trial can be three folds: Firstly, consumers will be 
encouraged to use the service, certain amount of user base will be accumulated in a 
shorter time. If there are no obviously better service providers or the transition cost is 
high, they are very likely to stay as loyal customers; Secondly, this user base will 
generate the network externality which can be enjoyed by later users; thirdly, these free-
ride users also consume system resources, they contribute to congestion externality. 
 
2.1.2 Product differentiation 
 
The idea that a firm can benefit from differentiating its product is a pervasive one in 
marketing. Products are differentiated when the products of different companies are not 
perfect substitutes. It is not necessary to make a better product than the competitor, the 
idea is to appeal to a different "market niche." The service provider can maximize his 
profit by offering a product line associated with different prices to cater for different 
market segments.  
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Product differentiation can be studied in two environments: monopoly market and 
oligopoly market. For the monopolist, the incentive to introduce a new variety is 
determined by the demand for the new product net of any loss of sales incurred on his 
existing products. For the new entrant in an oligopoly market, however, what matters is 
the level of demand for the new variety. The entrant’s incentive to introduce the new 
product is weakened as competition reduces the equilibrium price of the new offering.  
 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) is the first to examine a multi-product monopolist offering a 
range of products, differentiated along a single attribute, to heterogeneous consumers. 
Assuming that marginal costs increase more rapidly than quality, they conclude that the 
monopolist will find it optimal to price discriminate by offering multiple qualities. Most 
of other literatures conclude that, when goods are related along a quality or similar 
dimension, monopolist pricing should serve a self-selection role of discriminating among 
consumers and separating markets (e.g., Moorthy 1984, Armstrong 1999, Economides 
1998). 
 
Hotelling (1929) studied a duopoly model in which two firms compete on store location 
and price. Hotelling argues that the equilibrium strategy for each firm is to choose a 
location at the center of the market—this is his famous “principle of minimum 
differentiation”. The argument is that for any location of one firm, the other firm has an 
incentive to move toward its opponent in order to expand the territory under its exclusive 
control. However, his argument is shown to be flawed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). 
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By their claim, Hotelling did not consider the possibility of firms choosing prices that 
take away their opponents’ entire market share. In this case, there will be no price 
equilibrium in Hotelling’s model. With a slight modification of the model, they found 
that there’s a tendency for both sellers to maximize their differentiation. 
 
Later in Moorthy’s model (1988), homogeneous rather than heterogeneous consumer 
ideal points are assumed under equal prices. Unlike the previous models, quality is the 
dimension on which the firms can differentiate themselves, and ceteris paribus, every 
consumer prefers a higher quality to a lower quality. Moorthy also assumed a higher 
quality product costs more to produce than a lower quality product, to capture the trade-
off between the benefits of moving away from a competitor with the costs of doing so. 
His results suggest that competing firms will differentiate their products, and the first 
entrant of the market benefits from anticipating the arrival of a later one, by preempting a 
product position different from the one he may take without knowing the incoming 
entrant.  
 
Research on information goods only came above surface recently. There are two basic 
principles for designing a product line for information goods (Information Rule, 1998): 
(1) offer versions tailored to the needs of different customers. A full line of information 
products will maximize the total value of the information product; (2) design these 
versions to accentuate the needs of different groups of customers. 
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Jones and Mendelson (1997) focused on one important feature of information goods: 
Their marginal production cost is negligible compared to the amortized development cost 
per unit. Therefore, their model differs from previous ones in that it assumes zero 
production costs, but non-zero development costs. Their results show that markets for 
information goods lack the segmentation inherent in markets for industrial goods. This 
leads to more intense competition, which leads to greater product differentiation and 
almost winner-take-all equilibrium. They also find out that, given the opportunity to offer 
two products, the firm will opt for offering a single product. Therefore, differentiation 
won’t be a favorable option for information product providers. 
 
Hui and Tam (2001) conducted the study with a new definition of consumer types. Not 
like other researches defined the consumer type as their marginal willingness to pay for 
increment of the product quality, they define it as the minimum set of functions required 
by the consumers. Therefore, the consumers are assumed as “perfectly” price-sensitive. 
That is, consumers will opt for the software that charges the lower price, and will ignore 
the “excessive” functionality above their basic (minimum) requirements. With this 
definition, they set up a different model. Their results show that there is no fixed strategy 
that is optimal for software developers in a duopoly market with one-stage simultaneous 
move. Nevertheless, a unique reactive equilibrium does exist in a two-stage variation of 
the model. 
 
With congestion, product differentiation decision could be quite different from those in 
previous models. The perceived quality is not only decided by the resources invested by 
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the service provider, but also by the degree of congestion. Therefore, simply augmenting 
the resource investment will not necessarily lead to better service quality. 
 
The welfare effect of versioning is ambiguous. Varian (1997) compares the total surplus 
in four different pricing regimes: perfect price discrimination, a flat price at which only 
the high-end consumers purchases, a flat price at which both consumers purchase, and the 
optimal versioning solution. It is found that, if it is profitable to serve both classes of 
consumers under flat pricing, the welfare will be reduced by versioning.  
 
Deneckere and McAfee (1996) analyze the welfare effects of “damaged goods” in a 
model with exogenous quality. They show that when there are two distinct markets (e.g., 
tourist travelers and business travelers) and only the high-end market is served in the 
absence of price discrimination, versioning can easily result in a Pareto improvement: 
both classes of customers and the producer will be made better off. When there are many 
classes of customers with different product valuations, versioning may still result in a 
Pareto improvement, but the conditions it requires are very stringent. 
 
2.1.3 Price discrimination 
 
Firms recognize that consumers receive a surplus by purchasing a product, and the 
surplus they receive may differ across the consumer population due to their different 
preference. Therefore, charging different consumers with same price could not fully 
exploit the consumer surpluses. To deal with this inability, price discrimination, namely 
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charging different consumers with different prices, was introduced. For information 
goods, price discrimination can help digital product sellers to achieve higher returns. 
Varian and Shapiro (1998) used parsimonious economic models to show that price 
discrimination can effectively serve more customers and bring in additional benefits to 
both sellers and buyers. 
 
As defined by Pashigian (1995), there are three types of price discrimination:  
1. First-degree price discrimination captures all of the consumers’ surplus by 
charging every consumer the price they want to pay on every unit of product. To 
achieve this perfect discrimination, firms must have detailed information about 
each consumer’s demand function, which is almost impossible. 
2. With Second-degree price discrimination the firm offers a price schedule to the 
consumer where a different price is paid for different blocks of units, and then 
each consumer can sort into one of the blocks he prefers. This consumer self-
selection would be much easier for the firm to apply since it does not require the 
firm knowing who belongs to which segment. And most important, as stated by 
Moorthy (1984), self-selection allows the incorporation of competition.  
3. In the third type of discrimination, the firm has no information on individual 
demand functions but knows from experience that different groups of consumer 
have different demand functions. With third-degree price discrimination, firms 
use some characteristic of consumers to segment consumers into groups. 
However, it may be difficult to address individual segments: the firm must know 
who belongs to which segment, and consumer self-selection won’t function here. 
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In the context of our research, second-degree price discrimination is the generally 
adopted approach for information service providers. For years, IP phone companies and 
Internet access providers have been offering different prices at peak and non-peak hours. 
Consumers can identify themselves according to their value to the service time. It is also 
notable that with development of CRM (consumer relationship management), personal 
consuming information will be more readily accessible to service providers. It would be 
possible for firms to employ first and third degree price discrimination if they have 
enough information. However, this is beyond the topic of this paper. 
 
2.1.4 Congestion externality and Network externality 
 
In some consuming behavior, the consumption value depends not only on the consumer 
type and the quantity consumed, but also on the number of product “adopters”. This 
demand characteristic is often referred to as “network externality”. Two types of 
externalities are significant in information systems-congestion externalities decrease, and 
network externalities increase the utility of services. Katz and Shapiro (1985) use another 
type of classification to classify network effects into two types: direct and indirect types. 
Direct network externalities are generated through the direct effects of the number of the 
consumers, while indirect network effects arise while the value of a product is related 
with complementary goods or services. For example, when more cars are sold to the 




In current markets, an information system service with strong network externalities is 
usually more favorable. Firms are willing to invest great amount of time and effort to 
become the industry standards. (Moad, 1990) Being the market leader with larger user 
base means not only greater economics of scale, but also greater network externality.  
Dhebar and Oren (1985) also claim that, with network externalities, nonlinear pricing will 
be more attractive: since the fixed (usage-insensitive) component of the price is typically 
lower under nonlinear pricing, “smaller” consumers are encouraged earlier into the 
network. Greater externality will be the result. On the other hand, congestion externality 
reflects the nuisance caused by contention for shared resources, e.g. network bandwidth, 
CPU cycles. As user number increases, the quality they perceived degrades through 
slower response time, higher failure rate. Westland (1992) claimed that information 
system failed to consider congestion externalities may leads to over utilization of the 
system, and thus ill-will and frustration because the congestion is unanticipated. When 
congestion effects are highly nonlinear, lowered demand due to congestion may 
effectively shut down the system. Both problems may be exacerbated where the 
environment changes rapidly and transfer prices fail to respond promptly. Hackner and 
Nyberg (1994) find that competition was discouraged among the firms with congestion 
externality. In a standard Bertrand oligopoly model, firms may charge prices well above 
marginal cost despite goods being homogeneous in equilibrium. They also find that social 
welfare can be improved by means of a price ceiling.  
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Whang (1990) notes that congestion has become less important with the drop in hardware 
prices. However, his conclusion is toppled by the newly emerged multimedia application. 
The data width required by multimedia communication is far more than that by pure text 
communication. Therefore, congestion is again a phenomenon we can not ignore. 
Actually, with the emergence of new multimedia applications, we can expect a no stop 
thirst for system resources. Even though systems can be upgraded gradually, but in the 
short run, congestion will remain as a major concern of system managers and consumers. 
 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) argue that a firm’s dominant position will be enhanced if 
consumers give it higher expectation on its dominant position. Consumer expectation can 
also play an important role in markets with congestion externalities. If consumers 
expected that a firm’s service will become highly congested, they will try to find other 
substitutes. It will lead to a faster transition of user population from currently highly 
congested service to less congested service. 
 
Network externalities are nonexistent below what Oren, Smith and Wilson (1982) have 
called the “critical mass” of users of the system. A “critical mass” of subscribers is 
needed for sustaining equilibrium subscription prices. One solution (Rohlfs, 1974) is to 
have an initial price low enough to encourage new subscriptions. The monopolist can 
then raise the price gradually to the optimal steady-state level, trading off lower 
immediate revenues with the earlier achievement of long-run revenue levels.  However, if 
low price lasts for a longer time than needed, too much users may be attracted and system 
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performance will rapidly degraded to an unacceptable level. Certain measures have to be 
taken to prevent this kind of situation. 
 
2.1.5 Market entry 
 
How fast an information system reaches congestion depends how fast its user base grows. 
A central issue in new product development and planning is the market timing/entry 
decision. An entry too early may risk pushing an under-developed product into the 
market place, with possible negative results. For consumers of congestion prone services, 
it is also a crucial decision for when to purchase. Different entry time may give them 
radically different service qualities or prices. For information services, it could be even 
more important since online services are usually more accessible than traditional services. 
Users can easily enter or leave the service without the normal register process.  
 
Diffusion models relate the adoption rate of a new product to factors including time, 
population characteristics and product decision variables such as advertising and price. 
Most simple models of first purchase, follow directly or indirectly from Bass’ (1969) 
model: 
( )( )X a bX N X
t
∂ = + −∂  (1) 
N=ultimate adopting population 
X=cumulative number of adopters at t 
A, b=parameters to be estimated 
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This model is simple and captures two effects: the diffusion effect, primarily through the 
multiplicative nature of the ( )a bX+ term, and the saturation effect later on, captured 
through ( )N X− . While the model does not include marketing policy variables like price 
or advertising, it is a parsimonious and useful description of sales patterns over time for 




We classified congestion as offline and online congestion. For offline congestion, we put 
our emphasis on road congestion since the studies on it are extensive and it resembles 
online congestion in many ways so that it can be a perfect counterpart of online 
congestion. 
 
2.2.1 Road congestion, offline 
 
The phenomenon of congestion is extensively studied in road traffic. According to 
Lindsey and Verhoef (1999), traffic congestion can be studied either at a microscopic 
level where the motion of individual vehicles is tracked, or at a macroscopic level where 
vehicles are treated as a fluid-like continuum. Microscopic models are used to describe 
traffic behavior on lightly traveled roads where passing and lane changing are possible, 
while macroscopic studies works best on heavy congestion. A widely used class of 
microscopic models are car-following models, developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Such 
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models usually describe the motion of vehicle n+1 (the “follower”) in a traffic stream as a 
function of the motion of vehicle n (the “leader”) immediately ahead.  
 
Vickery (1969) classified road congestion into six types of situations: 1. Single 
interaction occurs whenever two transportation units approach each other closely enough 
so that one or the other must be delayed in order to avoid collision, no other units being 
sufficiently close to be immediately affected. 2. Multiple interaction tends to take place at 
higher level of traffic density, where one can expect the average speed to be a function of 
the flow of traffic. 3. Bottleneck situation is one where a relatively short route segment 
has a fixed capacity substantially smaller than that of neighbouring segments. 
Hypercongestion will occur in queues upstream of a saturated bottleneck. Sudden drop of 
flow speed will be observed in a hypercongestion. 4. A triggerneck situation is a more 
serious case of bottleneck situation when the queue backed up from the bottleneck 
interferes with the irrelevant flow of traffic. 5. Network and control congestion results 
whenever the applications of additional control measures are needed. 6. General density 
congestion happens when in the long run, congestion costs are a function of the overall 
density of transportation flows in a given area for all modes combined and over all routes, 
even though some modes may contribute less to the overall congestion relative to its 






2.2.2 Online congestion 
 
Computer networks have experienced an explosive growth over the past few years and 
with that growth have come severe congestion problems. For example, it is now common 
to see Internet gateways drop 10% of the incoming packets because of local buffer 
overflows. 
 
In October of ’86, the Internet had the first of what became a series of ‘congestion 
collapses’. During this period, the data throughput from LBL to UC Berkeley (sites 
separated by 400 yards and two IMP hops) dropped from 32 Kbps to 40 bps. The primary 
congestion indication in a TCP network, for example, INTERNET, is the dropping of 
data packets due to network overload. This forces the users to sharply adapt their 
transmission rates, resulting in rate oscillation and reduced throughput. Ramakrishman 
and Jain (1990) argued that explicit congestion notification can help ease the congestion 
condition. Brakmo and Peterson (1995) proposed a variant of TCP called-TCP-vegas in 
which end users try to detect congestion early by monitoring round trip times. However, a 
problem with these early congestion dealing proposals is that they treat all users 
identically. In practice, users have very different requirements and it would be desirable 
for the network to provide a differentiated service. Furthermore, without the 
differentiation reflecting the social cost imposed by a user, there tends to be rate 
adaptation behaviors among network users that are individually beneficial but socially 
harmful. (Ganesh and Laevens, 2001)  
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Kelly, Maulloo and Tan (1998) and Gibbens and Kelly (1999) have proposed a simple 
and innovative mechanism to implement usage-based charging. In contrast to other 
charging schemes, users are modeled as having a utility function that is additively 
separable over time, and increasing and concave in the instantaneous bandwidth they 
receive. Once prices are set, users can decide for themselves how best to satisfy their 
requirements at the give price. They also show that under certain conditions, this 
mechanism converges in the long run to a socially optimal allocation of bandwidth. 
Gibbens and Kelly (1999) and Key and Mcauley (1999) tried to study a variety of user 
strategies. They note that different objectives for the players could lead them to adopt 
different flow control schemes, without need for modifications to the network. 
 
An approach based on solving the dual to the social welfare maximization problem has 
been studied by Low and Lapsley (1999). Here, the network adapts prices based on 
observed aggregate demand, and users attempt to maximize their instantaneous utility 
based on the price feedback they receive. Users are greedy in attempting to maximize 
their utility and do not take account of the likely response of other users to the common 
price information. This may nevertheless be approximately optimal behavior for users if 
the network adjusts prices slowly. 
 
 
2.2.3 Consumer behavior with congestion externality, offline and online 
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Facing traffic congestion, car drivers have variable choices. To avoid congestion, they 
can look for a less congested road base on information they received or simply wait till 
congestion is relieved. However, if they were already in congestion, usually it is difficult 
to exit from it. Their moves in congestion are seriously restricted by other cars. That is, 
they need to pay a high transition cost. This usually leads to a high frequency of 
frustration. 
 
Unlike road congestion, there is no car-follow effect in network congestion, hence 
network users are independent in their behaviors in congestion, they can freely decide 
when to join and when to quit. The transition cost for a user to exit the congested service 
and choose a less congested service is relatively lower; sometimes it is just ‘a click 
away’. Hence we can expect a more frequent jump from congested ISP to a less 
congested one. Technically, ISPs can keep users informed of the current user number to 
help them estimate the congestion level. However, it is still not a popular move by now. 
Most users have no information on the user number of the service they choose until they 
start using it, although they can estimate the congestion situation according to their 
experiences. Furthermore, according to bottleneck theory, in a traffic jam, a vehicle’s 
move is only affected by the vehicles ahead. A new entrant won’t make any impact to the 
vehicles in front. While in network congestion, every one is affected when there is a new 
entrant. 
  
2.2.4 Strategy for ISPs with congestion externality, offline and online 
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According to Kay (1979), there are two main types of congestion-handling policy can be 
adopted, which can be described as “loss systems” and “delay systems”. In a loss system, 
demand exceeds system capacity is rejected. For example, guests who arrive when the 
hotel is full are turned away. When electricity demand is excessive, a portion of its 
consumers will be disconnected to keep the rest of consumers being served. A delay 
system, on the other hand, retains excess demand within the system until capacity to meet 
them becomes available. With emergence of information services, now there’s another 
option – quality degradation. When demand increases while system capacity remains 
unchanged, service quality for the consumers can be lowered. This quality degradation 
can be selective among consumers according to different ranking schemes. Priority can 
be given to those who are willing to pay more or who subscribe the service earlier. 
However, since current online services still lack the ability to distinguishly treat different 
users, the more common case is that all consumers suffer from quality degradation, in 
which the earlier consumers need to undertake the same level of quality impact as the 
later entrants. 
 
Congestion pricing is a common way to manage traffic congestion. There are different 
congestion pricing schemes such as charging on the basis of speed, with higher tolls for 
slower vehicles, or on vehicles sizes, operating characteristics, and so on. Surcharges 
might also be imposed on poor or careless drivers who tend to create greater congestion 
and are more prone to accidents. But unless charges can be levied nonanonymously, 
tolling on the basis of driving behavior is impractical because it is too costly to observe. 
Varying tolls over time has become practical through advances in electronic toll 
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collection technology. Time variation can range from peak/off-peak tolls with a single 
step to continuous time variation.  
 
When a user is trying to enjoy a congestion-prone service, he may encounter uncertainty 
about the system capacity, demand and facility characters. (Palma and Lindsey, 1996) It 
is intuitive that providing users information regarding their uncertainties can help them 
better utilize the service and alleviate congestion. Nowadays, there are many road 
information radios in the air. Drivers can receive the road situation information and then 
decide which way will be the most economic and efficient way. However, this radio 
information cannot cover all the roads and are often obsolete. More advanced road 
information system is still on the way of practical use.  
 
However, researches have shown adverse effects as a result of individual’s rational 
responses to information in the context of choice of driving route (Schelling, 1978; Ben-
Akiva, Palma, and Kaysi, 1991) and choice of time of use (Arnott, Palma, and Lindsey 
1991, 1996). Better information can induce changes in behavior that increase the 
deadweight loss from congestion. Palma and Lindsey (1996) suggested that it can be 
avoided by implementing congestion pricing in parallel with information provision. They 
study the effects of providing information to prospective users under three regimes: free 
access, non-responsive (habitual) congestion pricing, and responsive congestion pricing 
based on current information. They find that responsive congestion pricing is likely to 




Online service providers can use the same strategy as traditional service providers. 
However, they may encounter their own problems. For example, it is difficult for them to 
identify different users. Hence first degree differentiation is not as applicable as second 
degree differentiation for ISPs. As we can observe from current market, many ISPs will 
offer varied service plans. Consumers choose the one most suitable for their needs. It is 
easier to publish the information of congestion situation now by using the information 
technology capability naturally possessed by ISPs. The interwoven effect of information 
providing and congestion pricing is hence a more relevant topic to be studied. 
 
 
2.2.5 Competition and game theory 
 
We apply game theory to examine the non-cooperative outcomes of service providers 
who are competing to maximize their own profits. It allows the modelers to think like an 
economist when price theory does not apply. With game theory, we are now allowed to 
study the implications of rationality, self-interest, and equilibrium, both in market 
interactions that are modeled as games and non-market interactions. (Gibbons, 1997) 
Game theory has been widely applied to study multi-agent non-cooperative decision 
problem in many different contexts. There are four types of games: static or dynamic, and 




Shaked and Sutton (1982) studied the price competition through product differentiation, 
based on a three stage non-cooperative game. They find that in the equilibrium, exactly 
two potential entrants will choose to enter the industry; they will choose to produce 
differentiated products; and both will make positive profits. Game theory is also the 
essence of Moorthy (1988) and Jones, Mendelson (1997)’s research. To solve for the 
equilibrium of competing firms facing product and price choice, a common process is to 
first compute the price equilibrium, then get into the computation of product equilibrium.  
 
Rosenthal (1973) introduced a class of games in which each player chooses a particular 
combination of factors out of a common set of primary factors. The payoff associated 
with each primary factor is a function of the number of players who include it in their 
choice. The payoff a player receives is the sum of the payoffs associated with the primary 
factors included in his choice. Each game in this class possesses at least one pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium. This class of games were designed to study interactions in such fields 
as economics, traffic flows, and ecology and is named congestion games. 
 
In the context of our research, we will study the competing ISPs as players in a game to 







Chapter 3  
The consumer utility and product models 
 
 
In this section we set up the environment in which we will pursue my investigations. We 
will consider two types of markets: monopoly market and duopoly market.  
 
In each type of market, we first build the solution under the presumption that service 
quality is constant while user quantity increase. This model represents an information 
service without congestion externality and will serve as our frame of reference. We 
indexed it as model 1.  Then we compared results from model 1 with the results under the 
presumption that service quality is degrading when consumer number goes up (Model 2, 
model 3). There are two possible ways for the demand increase to affect the perceived 
consumer usability: one is that the product is equally shared by the consumers, the 
consumers evenly divide the service quality into its own perceived usability, this is a 
more common and direct effect, most of the online services fall into this category; the 
other situation is the consumer’s perceived usability is equally affected by the demand, 
that means every consumer suffers an equal amount of loss in usability when demand 
increase, it is often observed when the firm or trade organization has some kind of 
regulating mechanism to keep the system function gradually. For example, an Internet 
service provider may prescribe that the bandwidth offered to a consumer should be 
decreased in a linear relationship with the total user number, to ensure the total user 
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number he can support. In this way, the service provider may have more control over the 
user numbers and the service quality they receive. Another situation is when the system 
has some bottleneck, which can not be easily eliminated by upgrading the whole system. 
Under this situation, the congestion inflicted by increasing user number is generally 
independent of the service quality of the information system. These two types of demand-
quality relationships will be indexed as model 2 and model 3, respectively. We would 
like to see, under the two different quality-demand relationship assumptions, how profit-
maximizing firms’ reactions differ from each other. What’s more, it is also valuable to 
study a social planner’s decision in the markets, in which he will try to maximize the 
social welfare instead of just the firm’s profits. 
 
We define v  as the consumer type, or the consumer’s marginal willingness to pay. We 
assume a linear relationship between service quality and perceived usability. A consumer 
of type p  is willing to pay vs  for a unit of product (service) s . s  is the quality choice of 
the product (Service). It could have different interpretations for different markets. For 
example, for IP phone service, quality can be measured by the voice definition of 
conversation, and for online games, it will be measured by the speed of the game or 
connection success rate. All consumers prefer higher quality to lower quality, and it will 
be the basic motive for product differentiation. A higher type of consumer is willing to 
pay more for the same product than a lower type. We assume consumer types are 
distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. The assumption says, among other things, that consumers 
are heterogeneous in this market. Here we get the heterogeneity in consumers’ marginal 
willingness to pay, and that is necessary for product differentiation. The reason we 
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assume consumer types are distributed uniformly, is that we would like to remove non-
uniformity of the consumer type distributions as a possible explanation of product 
positioning. Otherwise, a firm will tend to set his product at positions preferred by some 
irregularly concentrated consumers.  
 
The price that a consumer needs to pay for the product is p. We assume that there are no 
costs associated with the decisions to commence or to relinquish consuming 
(subscription), i.e., no switching cost. Consumers will be free to choose the best service 
they can get at any time.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, the range of v, s, p are [0,1]. 
 
The service quality can be enjoyed by a consumer is decided by the quality set by the 
firm and the market demand. A consumer is fully informed of his received quality and the 
price before he makes the consuming decision, hence he can calculate his own net 
surplus. If his surplus is less than zero, he will just quit the market. Generally, a consumer 
is assumed to react to changes of his benefit immediately, that is to say, there is no time 
lag of his reaction to any benefit change induced by price, quality or any other source of 
variation. Although in subsequent analysis we notice that this immediate reaction is not 
always beneficial to consumer himself. 
 
The cost of supplying a product (service) of quality s is cs ( [0,1]c ∈ ), regardless of the 
quantity supplied. C is a non-negative constant that denotes the one-time development 
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cost of one unit of product quality. The assumption of identical cost functions rules out a 
trivial explanation of product differentiation, namely technological differences between 
the firms. The reason we assume constant return of scale, is that, usually the resources 
consumed in the development process, e.g., servers, bandwidth, can be increased with 




















Chapter 4  
Monopoly market                                                                                                                           
 
In a monopoly market, there is only one service provider. The provider tries to maximize 
his benefits and consumers can only choose either to buy or not to buy the service. We 
also like to know the solution of a social planner, for whom the social welfare is 
maximized. Social welfare is defined as the sum of the firm’s profit and the aggregate net 
surplus of consumers. 
 
Under the three different models we just defined, the consumer usability (Net surplus) 
will be as the following (p is the price the consumer needs to pay): 
 
Model1: U vs p= −          (4.1) 
Model2: vsU p
D
= −          (4.2) 




4.1 Model 1 
 
Figure 4.1 Relationship of U and D in model 1 
 
The demand for the information service consists of those consumers whose net surplus is 
higher than 0. That is, 
Demand 1 pD
s
= −          (4.1.1) 
(1 )pDp cs p cs
s
π = − = − −         (4.1.2) 
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Secondary derivation shows that 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 are both maximum. However, only when 
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Now we consider the social benefit: 
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Compared with monopolist, we can see that the price will be lowered to zero, and when 
1c < , the profit maximizing product produced by social planner has a higher quality than 
the product produced by monopolist, while it is lower when 1c > .  
 
A further look we can see that when * 0p p= =  and 1
2
c < , we have * 1s = . 
 
4.2 Model 2 
 
Now we study model 2, the normal quality degrading situation: 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1 Relationship of U and D in model 2 
 
The demand for the service with quality s consists of those consumers whose net utility is 
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When 0p = , we have 1D = , all consumers will enter the market. 
 
The Profit for a monopoly is  
spDp cs cs
s p
π = − = −+         (4.2.5) 
The first-order conditions over p and s yield: 
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Now 2( 1)sp cs c p
s p
π = − = −+         (4.2.7) 
The profit increases linearly with price. 
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After finding out the optimal market strategy solution of the monopolist, now we are 
trying to explore further into the field.  
 
Firstly we assume consumers react to any change in their usability immediately. For 
example, when a consumer’s usability drops below zero at a time, he will quit the market 
immediately, with no time delay. Now we suppose the firm raises the price from p to 
p p+ ∆ , according to (4.2.1), the consumers with their types between ( ( ),pD p p D
s s
+ ∆ ) 
will leave the market, now the demand is 1
s pD D
s p
− ∆= <+ . However, this is not the final 
demand in the equilibrium because with 1D , some consumers would be willing to return 
to the market while they are reluctant to do so with D, although with their return, the user 
number increases again, part of these just returned users will have to leave again. 
Actually, every demand change will result in a new demand change, resembling a chain 




= + + ∆ . 
 
Now we define nD  (n>1) as the demand at the nth time the consumers react to previous 
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sD D D D D
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+ ∆ + ∆− = − − = −
 (4.2.11) 
Therefore, we can observe a wavy fluctuation of user number around 1equilibriumD when 
price is raised. When 1p p
s
+ ∆ < , the fluctuation will finally converge to 1equilibriumD . 
When 1p p
s
+ ∆ ≥ , no convergence can be observed. To ensure the convergence, the 
service provider should set price below product quality, p s< . 
 
The equilibrium profit is ( )
( )
s p p cs
s p p
π + ∆= −+ + ∆     
 (4.2.12)  
We can tell that the p∆ in the numerator, representing the change in price, has a larger 
influence to the profit function than the p∆  in the denominator, which represents the 
change of the demand. 
 
Figure 4.2.2 is a description of this wavy fluctuation. We can observe that if a consumer 
can stay in the equilibrated market at last, he may go through some below zero net 
surplus periods in equilibrating stage. The lower is his consumer type, the more often he 
went through sub-zero periods. For a consumer who does not considers switching cost 
and firmly reject sub-zero surplus, he may have to repeatedly leave and return market and 
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that would be the origin of frustration.  To avoid this frustrating situation, a consumer can 
do better by prefiguring the equilibrium demand, which is more ready to be attained by 
the information service provider. 
 
Figure 4.2.2 Demand fluctuation with time when price increases 
 
When firm lowers the price from p to p p− ∆ , the consumers with their types between 
( ( ) ,p p D pD
s s
− ∆ ) will join the market, now the demand is 2 s pD Ds p
+ ∆= >+ . The 
equilibrium demand is 2equilibrium
sD
s p p
= + − ∆ . If all consumers respond to price change 
and network size float with no time lag, there will be some consumers who are first 
attracted by the lowered price, then driven out by the increasing congestion. Frustration is 




Figure 4.2.3 Demand fluctuation with time when price decreases 
 
Here we observed a very interesting result that the monopolist facing degrading service 
quality will set the price as high as possible. The most direct explanation from our 
analysis is that: As the price gets higher, some consumers have to leave the market. This 
decrease of consumer population will put the remaining consumers in a better situation. 
They can enjoy a bigger share of the service, which partly counteract the effect of price 
rise. Here, we denote this effect as “markup return”. Due to this effect, a monopolist 
tends to set the price higher, and when they have to lower the price to attract more users, 
it is better to set a user number ceiling to prevent congestion and frustration. A natural 
user number ceiling will be the next equilibrium demand under the new price. In our 
example, it is 2equilibrium
sD
s p p
= + − ∆ . Now the demand curve will be like figure 4.2.4. 
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Figure 4.2.4 Demand fluctuation with user number ceiling 
 
When price is raised, not only some consumers will be willing to stay in market after 
demand decrease, what’s more, the remaining consumers belong to the higher type, they 
are willing to pay a higher price in the exchange of a higher standard of service. 
Therefore, the profit gain by raising the price surpasses the loss it induces, the monopoly 
tend to set the price as high as possible.    
 
With the same logic, it would be easy to explain why the firm won’t set its product 




Figure 4.2.5 Diagram of 
s
π∂
∂  and π when c=0.3, 1p =  
We’ve already explored the impact of price changes in the situation of declining service 
quality, now in the same situation, we want to investigate if it is better off for consumers 
that ISPs inform the consumers the real time user population. 
 
Suppose the usability a user enjoys is a  when market demand is D . As demand 
increases, his usability decreases. The highest market demand he can accept without 
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Suppose a consumer is aware of his current usability a  and the population changing 
speed s , then he can estimate the time it takes to reach zero usability when market 
demand increases. If a consumer wants to purchase a service, he can use the same 
information to predict if the service will reach congestion too fast. 
 
Therefore, by informing consumers the real time user population, the ISP can help 
consumers elude congestion, which in turn, gives ISP a more stable user population. 
 
Now we consider the social benefit: 
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A further look can tell that *ts  is the system maximum. 
Now 
2 2( 2 1 1)
2( ) 2
s sp cT cs p
s p s p
− −= + − =+ +     
 (4.2.20) 
 
Compared it with the monopolist’ profit maximizing solution, the optimal price remains 
at 1, and when 1c > , * *1 1ts s< . Suppose the price is constant, the social planner will set the 
product quality at a position lower than the monopolist. The monopolist sets the price 
higher than social efficient level to maximize its profits. 
 
4.3 Model 3 
 
Now we study model 3  
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Figure 4.3.1 Relationship of U and D in model 3 
 
Different from model2, the consumer’s utility function is 
U vs D p= − −  
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quality starts increasing from zero, the profit dropped below zero for a while, then 
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c−  to ensure positive profit, and it would be his optimal choice to locate the product 




Figure 4.3.2 Diagram of 
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Now we consider the social benefit: 
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Now we define total surplus as   
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A further look can tell that *ts  is a local minimum. Similar as the monopolist situation, the 
maximum will be reached when 1s = . Compared it with the monopolist’s profit 
maximizing solution, we find that with same products, the optimal price for social 




Now we have found out the optimal strategies for a monopolist or social planner in the 
three user usability models. We compared the results in table 1. At first glance we notice 
that in model 2, optimal price are highest compared to those of other models, it implies 
that model 2 demonstrates strongest tendency for congestion. Lowering price, as a 
marketing strategy to attract more users, will be avoided to the greatest extent in model 2.  
Same logic will explain why in model 2 and model 3, firms will not set quality as high as 




For a social planner, it is not always true by lowering the price to give better benefits to 
consumers, when congestion is in the play. Consumers could suffer from worse 
congestion if price were lowered recklessly, and it intuitively explained why social 
planner’s optimal prices in model 2 and model 3 are not zero. 
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Table 1:  Comparison of the three models 
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A mixture of the optimal strategies from model 2 and model 3, suggests that with 
degrading quality, the price tends to be set higher, and the unit development cost should 
be lower to allow the firm gain positive profit. 
 
We also notice that consumer frustration will pervade if ISPs use price cutting too often 
or too drastically. Price is not the only thing that consumers care about now, service 
quality could be more decisive. ISPs need to consider elaborately the balance between 
price and consumer perceived quality. To help users elude the congestion, ISPs can keep 
users informed of the real-time user numbers. For consumers, it is not recommended for 
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them to join a service soon after a price cut, if the service was not highly valued 
originally, or they are likely to suffer from frustration. Wait-and-see for a while until the 



















Chapter 5  
Duopoly market                                                                                                                            
 
In the duopoly market, there are two firms, indexed 1 and 2, and they each chose their 
product from the interval [0,1] . We assume firm1’s product is 1 1( , )s p , firm2’s product is 
2 2( , )s p , 1 2s s> . Here we will pay most of our attention on the simultaneous form of 




In this type of competition, each firm made their decision of the service quality choice 
simultaneously. Then, having observed the other firm’s service quality choice, each firm 
simultaneously chooses a price for its product. This type of competition is most often 
observed in a new market, both firms are new entrants, and there is no product leader. 
Since service quality choices are more permanent than price choices-price competition 
often takes place under conditions where service quality can not be easily changed, 
(Moorthy 1988) we assume prices choice happens after the service quality choice. 
Therefore, in each model, we try to find the Nash equilibrium in prices first. As defined 
by Moorthy, the Nash equilibrium in prices is simply a price for each firm such that 
neither firm wishes to choose a different price unilaterally. Then under this price 
equilibrium, we try to find the Nash equilibrium in service qualities. The service quality 
equilibrium, then, is a service quality for each firm such that neither firm would choose a 
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different service quality unilaterally, recognizing that both firms will determine their 
prices according to the price equilibrium aforementioned. 
 
 
5.1 Model 1 
 
The net benefit for a consumer choosing firm1, 1 1 1U vs p= −  
The net benefit for a consumer choosing firm2, 2 2 2U vs p= −  
 
Since 1 2s s> , we can tell that 1 2p p> . If 1 2p p< , no consumer will choose product 2, 
since 1 1 1 2 2 2U vs p U vs p= − > = −  with all [0,1]v ∈ . 
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According to consumer self-selection, for a consumer to choose firm1, it is necessary that 
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The profits of the two firms are: 
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This is the price equilibrium in which each firm is reluctant to move away from his 
position when the other is on his corresponding position, when firm1 choose product 
1s and firm2 choose product 2s .  
 
Now we substitute 1 2,p p  in (5.1.5) and (5.1.7) with (5.1.9) and (5.1.10), we have 
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= , then original equations can be written as 
3 2(12 8) (12 48 ) 64 16 0ci c i c i c− + − + − + − =      (5.1.13) 
3 212 (48 7) 64 4 0ci ci c i c− + − − + =       (5.1.14) 
(5.1.13)+(5.1.13), we have 28 5 12 0i i− + =      (5.1.15) 
It is easy to find that there is no solution for equation 5.1.15 













, it indicates there is no Nash equilibrium 
in the duopoly. No matter what quality positions the two firms chose in the first 
phase, they will find the incentive to deviate in the second phase. 
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Now we try to reach some partial solutions using simulation. Suppose 2s  is 
predetermined, then the optimal solution for 1s  will be a function of 2s  with every given 
value of c, and vise versa. The partial solution is listed in table1.  
 
 X 
c 2 1s xs=  1 2s xs=  2 1s xcs=  1 2s xcs=  
0.1 -0.0144796 N/A N/A N/A 
0.2 -0.0351596 9.99327 N/A 49.96635 
0.3 N/A 9.8763 N/A 32.921 
0.4 1.09065 9.76662 2.726625 24.41655 
0.5 0.922274 9.66351 1.844548 19.32702 
0.6 0.831669 9.56632 1.386115 15.94387 
0.7 0.772731 9.47451 1.103901 13.53501 
0.8 0.73037 9.3876 0.912963 11.7345 
0.9 0.697976 9.30515 0.775529 10.33906 
1 0.672132 9.22681 0.672132 9.22681 
Average 0.771192 9.584454 1.345973 15.27154 
Table 2 partial solution of 1s  and 2s  
 
With simple average we have the following optimal product solution: 
2 11.345973s cs=         (5.1.16) 
1 215.27154s cs=         (5.1.17) 
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5.1.16 and 5.1.17 prescribe the best strategy a latter entrant will take in view of the 
position taken by the early entrant. If the early entrant stays still, then the latter entrant 
will find no incentive to move from his best strategy too. From the two partial solutions, 
we find that they can not exist at the same time. It indicates that if firms make their 
service quality decision sequentially, the latter entrant will always have the advantage to 
position itself at the optimal service quality, lower or higher compared to the early entrant 
according to the profit equations and the partial equilibrium. This advantage won’t last 
for long since the early entrant will find incentive to move to a better position soon. 




> ( 0.22c > ), both firms 
will finally position their products at 1, when 0.22c < , they will compete until they both 
reach 0. These are the multi-period market equilibriums. 
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Figure 5.1.1 Diagram of two partial solutions, when 0.22c >  
 
5.2 Model 2 
 




= −  




= −  
 
If both firms set prices and products at same level, if 1 2D D> , then 1 2U U< , it is natural 
that the consumers will switch from firm1 to firm2, until 1 2D D= . 
  
According to consumer self-selection, for a consumer to choose firm1, it is necessary that 
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 21 2
1 2
vs vs p pU U p p v s sD D
D D
−> => − > − => >
−
     (5.2.1) 
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To simplify the analysis, we assume that 1 2 2 2
1 2 2
1 2





, or 1 1 2 2
1 2
p D p D
s s
> . 
Different from model 1, 1p  is not necessarily higher than 2p . According to equation 




− <  and 1 2 1 2
1 2
s s p p
D D
− > − , some consumers will choose firm 2 
when 1 2p p< .  
 
Intuitively, consumers will go for the firm that can give them better utility in the first run 
of self-selection. Thus consumers aggregated at firm 1 until congestion is so serious that 
firm 1 is no longer the better service provider. Then some consumers will turn to firm 2, 
with lower service quality and higher price, but less congestion. 
 
Demand for product1, 1 21
1 2
1 2




      (5.2.2) 
Demand for product2, 1 2 2 22
1 2 2
1 2




     (5.2.3) 
(1)+(2), we have 2 21 2
2
1 p DD D
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1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
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+ + + + +
       (5.2.4) 
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       (5.2.5) 
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It is easy to find out that 1 2D D> , the higher quality product also has a higher 
market demand. 
 




1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
s ps s p




= − = −
+ + + + +
    (5.2.6) 
1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
p sD p cs p css p p ps s p p
s s
π += − = −
+ + + + +
    (5.2.7) 
 







s p s p p s
s p s p
π π + −− = >+ +  
 
Therefore, when two firms set their products at same quality level, the firm with 
higher price will enjoy a higher profit. 
 
Assume 1 2 1 21 2 1 2
2 2
s p p pA s s p p
s s
= + + + + +  
 
2 1 2 2
1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2
2
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 )p s p pp s s p p
s s s c
s A A
π + + + + +∂ = − −∂     (5.2.8) 
1 2 1 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2 2
2
1
2 ( ) (1 )s p s p ps s p s s p p
s s s
p A A
π + + + + + + +∂ = −∂     (5.2.9) 
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1 2 1 2
1 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2
2
( ) (1 )s p p pp s p
p s s c
s A A




2 1 2 2 2
2
2
( ) (1 )s pp s p
p s s s
p A A












π∂ >∂ , by first order conditioning analysis we find there is no 
market equilibrium. We also notice that this result is always true regardless of the 
relationship between cost and the service quality. Both firms will try to set their prices as 
high as possible. It is also easy to find out that a monopolist would not have the incentive 
to differentiate his product. Even if he differentiates, both prices will be set at the same 
level, the higher boundary 1, and hence the products will be at same level too.  
 
A notice is that although there’s no pure strategy Nash equilibrium in model 2, it is still 
possible to find mixed strategy NE. 
 
 
5.3 Model 3 
 
Following the process in the previous condition 
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The net benefit for a consumer choosing firm1, 1 1 1 1U vs D p= − −  
The net benefit for a consumer choosing firm2, 2 2 2 2U vs D p= − −  
 
To ensure consumers receive non-negative usability: 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
0 p DU vs D p v
s
+= − − > => >  
2 2
2 2 2 2
2
0 p DU vs D p v
s
+= − − > => >  
 
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 2
( )p D p DU U v
s s
+ − +> => > −  
 
To simplify the analysis, we assume that 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 2 2
( )p D p D p D
s s s
+ − + +>−  or 
1 1 2 2
1 2
p D p D
s s
+ +> . 
Demand for product1, 1 1 2 21
1 2
( )1 p D p DD
s s
+ − += − −      
Demand for product2, 1 1 2 2 2 22
1 2 2
( )p D p D p DD
s s s
+ − + += −−    
Then we have 
2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2 21
s s s s p p s p sD
s s s s s
+ + − − −= + + − +        (5.3.1) 
 2 1 2 2 2 12 2
1 2 1 2 21
s s p p s pD
s s s s s
− + + −= + + − +         (5.3.2) 
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The profits of the two firms are: 
1 1 1 1D p csπ = −   
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This is the price equilibrium in which each firm is reluctant to move away from his 
appointment when the other is on his corresponding appointment, when firm1 choose 
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This is the product equilibrium in which each firm is reluctant to move away from his 
appointment when the other is on his corresponding appointment, when firm1 choose 
service 1s and firm2 choose service 2s . 
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Substitute 1 2,p p  in (5.3.5), (5.3.6) with (5.3.3), (5.3.4), we can have the approximate 
product equilibrium using simulation. With every given c, we find that product 
equilibrium only exist when 0.3c <   
 
c 2s  1s  
0.1 .3517490246 .4067638466 
0.2 3.793648701 6.281420744 
0.3 -.3239284285 2.118402851 
0.4 -.5137792104 2.032405358 
0.5 -4.686232866 -1.507067628 
0.6 -.5870119338 2.014599559 
0.7 -.6019772208 2.011618093 
0.8 -.6121418554 2.009679116 
0.9 -.6195171950 2.008308744 
1 -.6251209620 2.007285260 
Table 3 Product equilibrium of model 3 
 
When 0.2c < , the product equilibrium is 2 .3517490246s = , 1 .4067638466s = . When 
marginal cost gets higher, it is getting harder to achieve equilibrium. It implies that the 
market will be more stable when technologies advances and then marginal cost could be 
lowered. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
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Our results show that markets with quality degradation differ significantly from those 
with constant usability. There exist price equilibrium and partial product equilibriums in 
Model 1, while in model 2, both firms will try to be the price leader and no equilibrium, 
therefore, could be established. As to model 3, it demonstrates a behavior similar with 
that of model 1. It implies that indirect congestion externality give a less prominent 
influence to the market, compared to direct congestion externality. 
 
Table 4:  Comparison of the three models in duopolist market 
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When 0.2c < , 
2 .3517490246s = ,
1 .4067638466s =  
 
 
In model 2, product differentiation will not be favored by ISPs, market with congestion 








Chapter 6  
Contributions and Future Research 
 
The main contribution of the paper is the analytical insight that when quality is affected 
by market demand (congestion externality), the market strategy for monopolist and 
duopolist will be quite different. The congestion externality significantly eases the 
demand decrease due to price increase. The market tends to be more stable than usual. 
We also notice that a wavy fluctuation of user number will occur with price change and 
frustration will emerge if consumers choose to leave market immediately after they find 
their net surplus is below zero. A firm may prevent this frustration by informing its users 
expected changes of user numbers. On the other hand, consumers are encouraged to delay 
their reaction to price changes, it will ease the wavy fluctuation situation and users could 
enjoy a higher stability of service quality. 
 
There are additional factors not included in our model that may motivate ISPs to 
differentiate their services. Threat of entry, nonlinear utility functions, eco-geographical 
gaps could give ISPs incentives for differentiation. To cover these factors in the future 
study would be very helpful to elicit more practical insights.  
 
When consumer number increases, the direct service quality perceived by the consumer 
will get lower. However, we shall not ignore the fact that, some goods and services 
generate more value when more users consume the same goods and services. (Network 
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externality) For many instances, both of the effects can be observed in the same product. 
Some examples are online chatting service, Internet community and online game. It 
would be interesting to study this situation, to find out a solution in balance of the two 
counteractive effects. 
 
In our model, consumers only have the option to join or quit the service. However, since 
duration of service time would be another important decision for consumers, it could be 
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